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Introduction 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”1 
 
In 1991, ten-year old Amber Garrett disappeared from her home in 
Harrison, Ohio, a town lying on the Ohio-Indiana border.2 Authorities 
would later find Amber’s body near Bright, Indiana, not far from the 
Ohio border.3 Her cause of death was multiple stab wounds and blunt 
force trauma to the head—injuries that did not occur in the area where 
authorities found her body.4 An investigation implicated Jefferey 
Wogenstahl, an acquaintance of Amber’s mother.5 The State of Ohio 
subsequently indicted Wogenstahl for Amber’s murder.6 Wogenstahl 
 
1. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
2. State v. Wogenstahl, 84 N.E.3d 1008, 1009–10 (Ohio 2017). 
3. Id. at 1011. 
4. Id. at 1011–12. 
5. Id. at 1009. 
6. Id. at 1012. 
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was convicted of aggravated murder in the Ohio Court of Common 
Pleas and was sentenced to death.7 
Wogenstahl’s case made its way to the Supreme Court of Ohio, 
where he challenged Ohio’s jurisdiction over his case.8 Wogenstahl 
asserted that the evidence presented at his trial proved Amber’s murder 
occurred in Indiana because an eyewitness observed Amber alive in a 
car heading in the direction of Indiana.9 The State of Ohio, for its part, 
suggested that the death occurred in Ohio because evidence showed 
that Wogenstahl had taken Amber to his Ohio apartment.10 The 
majority opinion written by Justice Sharon L. Kennedy found neither 
of these arguments persuasive and concluded that the location of 
Amber’s murder could not be conclusively determined.11 
Without any conclusive determination of where the murder took 
place, the majority relied on Subsection (D) of Ohio’s criminal law 
jurisdiction statute.12 Subsection (D) provides: 
When an offense is committed under the laws of this state, and it 
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense or any 
element of the offense took place either in this state or in another 
jurisdiction or jurisdictions, but it cannot reasonably be deter–
mined in which it took place, the offense or element is conclusively 
presumed to have taken place in this state for purposes of this 
section.13 
Relying on this provision, the court presumed that Amber’s murder 
took place in Ohio and jurisdiction was therefore proper in the state for 
Wogenstahl’s aggravated murder prosecution.14 
The Wogenstahl majority ended its analysis there, finding a 
conclusive, statutory grant of jurisdiction to the Ohio courts.15 Justice 
Judith L. French, however, raised in her concurring opinion a potential 
problem with this conclusion: “there is a reasonable question as to the 
constitutionality” of Subsection (D).16 Although declining to make a 




9. Id. at 1015. 
10. Id. at 1013. 
11. Id. at 1016. 
12. Id. 
13. Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.11(D) (2005). 
14. Wogenstahl, 84 N.E.3d at 1016. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 1016–17 (French, J., concurring). 
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highlighted decisions from the Supreme Court of the United States 
which hold that mandatory presumptions that remove the burden of 
proof from the prosecution violate the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.17 Because, “by its plain terms,” Subsection 
(D) creates a mandatory presumption of jurisdiction, Justice French 
wrote that “it appears, then, that [Subsection (D)] violates the rule 
[from the Supreme Court of the United States] if jurisdiction is an 
element of the offense that the state bears the burden of proving.”18 
This comment seeks to answer the question left unanswered by 
Justice French’s concurring opinion: whether Subsection (D) of Ohio’s 
criminal jurisdiction statute is constitutional under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part I will provide background 
on territorial jurisdiction in the United States. This section will address 
both the common-law development of territorial jurisdiction and the 
typical state statutes that define a state’s territorial jurisdiction. This 
part will conclude that territorial jurisdiction is fundamentally about 
sovereign power and as such is generally confined by a state legislature’s 
willingness to enforce its laws. Despite this, states tend to restrict their 
jurisdiction to cases where there is a sufficient territorial connection 
between the criminal conduct and the state. Part II will then address 
the due process limits associated with creating evidentiary presump–
tions. This section will ultimately conclude that territorial-scope 
statutes that create mandatory presumptions violate due process 
because territorial jurisdiction is a necessary fact that the prosecution 
must prove to ensure a fair, non-arbitrary prosecution. Part III will 
then look at two specific territorial-scope provisions that create 
evidentiary presumptions: (1) a presumption of jurisdiction when a 
body is found in the state; and (2) the presumption in Subsection (D) 
of Ohio’s statute that creates a presumption whenever the jurisdiction 
cannot be reasonably determined. Part III will conclude that while the 
first type of presumption is constitutional because it provides for a 
permissive inference with a reasonable connection to the state, the one 
in Subsection (D) does not survive constitutional muster because it 
creates a mandatory presumption. Part IV will present some potential 
 
17. Id. at 1017 (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 n.2, 325 (1985) 
and Sandstorm v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523–24 (1979)). 
18. Id. Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor, joined by Justice William M. O’Neill, 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which she argued that the evidence conclusively 
showed that the murder took in Indiana. Id. at 1018 (O’Connor, C.J., 
dissenting). In the Chief Justice’s view, the evidence showed that Amber 
was still alive in Wogenstahl’s car as it headed down a road that would not 
reenter Ohio, but instead could only lead to Indiana. Id. at 1019. The Chief 
Justice refuted the majority’s view that Wogenstahl may have inflicted the 
fatal injuries before the witness saw Amber in the vehicle as lacking any 
evidence. Id. Therefore, the Chief Justice would have held that Wogenstahl 
should have been prosecuted in Indiana, not in Ohio. Id. at 1021. 
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solutions to address the problems with Subsection (D), including 
whether Wogenstahl can be re-prosecuted in Indiana. 
I. Background of Territorial Jurisdiction 
A. Common Law Background 
Jurisdiction refers to a variety of limitations on a court’s authority 
to try a particular action or charge.19 The subject of this comment deals 
exclusively with territorial jurisdiction, those limits on authority 
stemming from “the permissible geographic scope of penal legislation.”20 
The authority of a state to enforce its laws has historically been limited 
by its territorial boundaries.21 At common law, this “territorial 
principle” was the exclusive grounding for jurisdiction; a government 
could enforce its laws over a criminal defendant only if the offense 
conduct took place, or the result of the criminal conduct happened, 
within its territorial limits.22 The territorial principle has its roots in 
the concept of sovereignty.23 Because the criminal breached the King’s 
(or Queen’s) peace, the monarch was entitled under the law to remedy 
the damage to his or her dignity by punishing the offender.24 This 
naturally limited jurisdiction only to the extent where there could be 
an affront to the monarch’s dignity, i.e. within the monarch’s realm.25 
 
19. 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. 
Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 16.1(a) (4th ed. 2015 & Supp. 2020). 
20. See 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, § 16.4(a). In addition to territorial 
jurisdiction, the term jurisdiction also refers to “(1) the authority of a 
particular court to try a certain level of offense . . . ; (2) the authority of a 
particular court to adjudicate a particular type of action . . . ; [and] (3) the 
court’s authority to try the particular person . . . .” Id. § 16.4(a) n.1; see 
also State v. Rimmer, 877 N.W.2d 652, 661 (Iowa 2016). 
21. See The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) (“The laws of no 
nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards 
its own citizens. They can have no force to control the sovereignty or rights 
of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction. And, however general and 
comprehensive the phrases used in our municipal laws may be, they must 
always be restricted in construction, to places and persons, upon whom the 
Legislature have authority and jurisdiction.”). See also Wendell Berge, 
Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 238, 
238 (1931) (“The authority of legislatures and courts in criminal matters is 
supposed to be circumscribed by the territorial boundaries of the state.”). 
22. 4 LaFave et al, supra note 19, at § 16.4(c). 
23. Albert Levitt, Jurisdiction over Crimes, 16 J. Am. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 316, 328 (1925). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
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The location of the prosecution in medieval England was further 
restricted by the right to a trial by a “jury of the vicinage,” a jury made 
up of citizens of the county in which the crime took place.26 A defendant 
could only be tried under the common law in the county where he or 
she committed the offense and nowhere else.27 The reasoning for this 
being that only a jury of the vicinage could fully understand the facts 
of the case to effectively adjudicate the crime.28 Common-law courts 
were therefore required to select a single jurisdiction where the 
defendant could be tried.29 Courts would choose this jurisdiction by 
selecting a single locus where the “gist of the offense” occurred, which 
would then be the sole forum where the government could prosecute 
the defendant.30 In the case of murder, for example, the offense occurred 
in the jurisdiction where the fatal force “struck” the victim because the 
gist of the homicide offense was causing the death, not the death itself.31 
At the time of the Founding, the place of a criminal prosecution 
was a concern to the Framers.32 Their complaints against King George 
III, after all, included one “[f]or transporting [colonists] beyond Seas to 
 
26. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93 n.35 (1970). Although the word 
“vicinage” technically means neighborhood, English courts could empanel 
juries of the county, rather than strictly a jury of the neighborhood. Id. 
(citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *350–51). 
27. 3 Edwardo Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 48 (1797). 
See also State v. Smith, 421 N.W.2d 315, 318 (Minn. 1988) (stating 
common law did not recognize concurrent jurisdiction over offenses); State 
v. Hall, 19 S.E. 602, 605 (N.C. 1894) (same). 
28. See 3 Coke, supra note 27, at 48. 
29. See 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, at § 16.4(c). 
30. Larry Kramer, Jurisdiction over Interstate Felony Murder, 50 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1431, 1434 (1983). 
31. 3 Coke, supra note 27, at 48. For a discussion of common law “loci” for 
different offenses besides murder, see text accompanying 4 LaFave et al., 
supra note 19, at § 16.4(c) n.48–55. It is worth noting that the concept of 
“jury of the vicinage” sounds more like venue, the location of the 
prosecution, rather than territorial jurisdiction, the court with authority to 
try the defendant. Most courts do treat vicinage as being non-jurisdictional, 
see, e.g., State v. Bowman, 588 A.2d 728, 730 (Me. 1991), while others 
discuss it in the same breath as territorial jurisdiction, see State v. Rimmer, 
877 N.W.2d 652, 664–65 (Iowa 2016). Yet the common law vicinage analysis 
is the same as the one used by state courts to decide whether the state has 
territorial jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Apkins, 146 S.W. 431, 434 
(Ky. 1912) (determining jurisdiction proper in Ohio, not Kentucky, because 
defendant was “struck” in Ohio). See also 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, 
at § 16.4(a) (“The issues which [territorial jurisdiction] presents are often 
roughly analogous to those considered in determining venue.”). 
32. United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 6 (1998). 
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be tried for pretended offences.”33 Consequently, two provisions of the 
Constitution preserve a right to be tried in the state where the crime 
shall have been committed: Article III34 and the Sixth Amendment.35 
Concerns about Article III not adequately guaranteeing the common-
law right to a “jury of the vicinage” indeed formed part of the impetus 
for drafting the Sixth Amendment in the first place.36 
The applicability of these provisions on the states, however, is 
dubious. Most obviously, the Supreme Court37 and state supreme 
courts38 have ruled that the specific provision in Article III applies only 
to criminal proceedings in federal courts. On the other hand, the so-
called “vicinage clause” in the Sixth Amendment, the portion of the 
amendment requiring a trial by a jury in the judicial district where the 
crime was committed, has not been incorporated along with the rest of 
the Sixth Amendment’s “jury clause.”39 The United States Senate, at 
the time the Sixth Amendment was being drafted, opposed the original 
wording of the Amendment, which included an explicit requirement 
that juries be drawn from the “vicinage.”40 In a letter to Edmund 
Pendleton discussing the Senate’s debates on the amendment, James 
Madison indicated that the Senate did not consider a constitutional 
amendment preserving the right to a jury of the “vicinage” necessary 
because the then-pending Judiciary Act of 1789 would adequately 
preserve that right.41 Because the Judiciary Act applied to the federal 
court system and not the states, the Framers likely viewed this 
 
33. The Declaration of Independence para. 21 (U.S. 1776). 
34. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“[S]uch [criminal] Trial shall be held in 
the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed . . . .”). 
35. Id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed . . . .”). 
36. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 93–94 (1970); see also Charles Warren, 
New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. 
L. Rev. 49, 105 (1924). 
37. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96, 101 
(1888). 
38. See, e.g., Ex parte McNeely, 14 S.E. 436, 440 (W. Va. 1892). 
39. See, e.g., Price v. Superior Ct., 25 P.3d 618, 625–56 (Cal. 2001) (holding 
the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage clause not incorporated to the states); 
Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (same); 
Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases 
holding the same). See also 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, at text 
accompanying § 2.6(b) nn.48–52. 
40. Williams, 399 U.S. at 95. 
41. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-12-02-0268 [https: 
//perma.cc/H7YW-THX4]. 
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provision as restricting the federal government from prosecuting 
citizens in any judicial district, rather than codifying a right to be tried 
within the territory where a crime was committed in every criminal 
proceeding. 
Although the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee to the 
defendant the right to be tried where the crime was committed, the 
concept of territorial jurisdiction nonetheless serves an important role 
in our system of federalism. Chief Justice John Marshall in Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon,42 wrote that every sovereign has “[a] full and 
absolute territorial jurisdiction” that is “incapable of conferring extra-
territorial power.”43 The Constitution preserved for the state 
governments “certain exclusive and very important portions of 
sovereign power,”44 including the power to enforce a criminal code.45 
The states, in other words, have a “historic right and obligation . . . to 
maintain peace and order within their confines.”46 A state’s interest in 
vindicating violations of its own laws could never be satisfied by the 
prosecution of that crime in another state.47 
Because of this sovereign right, state courts in the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century tended not to assert jurisdiction 
over a defendant accused of homicide when, per the common-law rule, 
the defendant struck the victim in another state.48 But then the rigidity 
of this rule gave way to the realities of administering justice in an 
increasingly mobile and interconnected world.49 Even at an early stage, 
courts started breaking away from the rigid definitions set out in the 
common law, finding flexibilities that allowed for multiple jurisdictions 
 
42. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
43. Id. at 137. 
44. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (quoting The Federalist 
No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
45. Id. (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 
(1982)). 
46. Id. (quoting Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959)). 
47. Id.  
48. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Apkins, 146 S.W. 431, 432, 434 (Ky. 1912) 
(holding jurisdiction proper in Ohio when victim ingested poison in Ohio 
but died in Kentucky); State v. Gessert, 21 Minn. 369, 370 (1875) (holding 
jurisdiction proper in Minnesota when defendant stabbed victim in 
Minnesota but victim died in Wisconsin); State v. Carter, 27 N.J.L. 499, 
502–03 (N.J. 1859) (holding jurisdiction proper in New York when 
defendant fatally injured victim in New York but victim later died in New 
Jersey). See also United States v. Guiteau, 12 D.C. (1 Mackey) 498, 499, 
536–37 (D.C. 1882) (holding defendant who shot President James A. 
Garfield in the District of Columbia had to be prosecuted in the District 
even though President Garfield died in New Jersey). 
49. Levitt, supra note 23, at 334. 
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to exist over certain crimes in certain contexts.50 The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, for instance, recognized that at common law a 
Massachusetts court could exercise jurisdiction over a homicide 
prosecution when the victim died in the state but was struck on the 
high seas because the death was the result of the “continuing operation 
of the [defendant’s] mortal blow.”51 Although Massachusetts was willing 
to recognize this flexibility in the common law when the crime occurred 
on the high seas, other states were less willing to do so when it involved 
challenging the jurisdiction of another state.52 
The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Strassheim v. Daily53 was the 
first time that the Court endorsed the expansion of territorial 
jurisdiction beyond the narrow confines of the strict common-law rule. 
In Strassheim, the Court considered whether a fraud perpetrated in a 
state violated state law, despite the fact that the defendant never 
entered the state.54 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, held that 
such actions violated the laws of the state where the harm of the crime 
took place, stating: 
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and 
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in 
punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the 
effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its 
power.55 
From the statement “detrimental effects,” many state courts and 
legislatures concluded that a state could extend its jurisdiction to 
prosecutions beyond the previously narrow confines of the common 
law.56 
 
50. Commonwealth v. Adair, 89 S.W. 1130, 1131 (Ky. 1906) (“The [common] 
law is generally elastic enough to defeat tricks, without enabling statutes 
for the purpose.”). For a detailed description of these common-law excep–
tions, see Kramer, supra note 30, at 1435–36. 
51. Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1, 4–5, 10 (1869). 
52. See Ex parte McNeely, 14 S.E. 436, 439 (W. Va. 1892) (disagreeing with 
Macloon that common law created jurisdiction over defendant when a 
person was struck in another state and died in the forum state). 
53. 221 U.S. 280 (1911). 
54. Id. at 281–82, 284–85. 
55. Id. at 285 (emphasis added). 
56. See, e.g., State v. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d 1027, 1035–36 (Fla. 2000); In re 
Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 610–11 (Mass. 1999); State v. Wootten, 756 
A.2d 1222, 1225 (Vt. 2000); see also 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, at 
§ 16.4(c); infra text accompanying notes 76–77; discussion of statutes 
expanding jurisdiction infra Part II. 
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The Court affirmed in United States v. Bowman57 that the 
extraterritorial application of a government’s laws did not need to be 
explicitly stated in a statute.58 Rather, a government could extraterri–
torially enforce its laws by criminalizing conduct that could logically 
occur outside the jurisdiction.59 The Court cited as examples federal 
statutes that criminalized interfering with the operation of American 
naval and consular officers.60 In the Court’s view, because these statutes 
criminalized conduct that would likely occur outside the territorial 
borders of the United States, the statutes would be useless if their 
application was limited to United States territory.61 
The Supreme Court in Skiriotes v. Florida62 appears to have 
removed an explicit requirement that any criminal conduct occur within 
a state as long as the defendant is a citizen of the forum state. In 
Skiriotes, Florida prosecuted a Florida fisherman for illegally fishing for 
sponges on the high seas.63 The Court framed the discussion as the 
extent of state power in prosecuting defendants accused of violating 
state statutes beyond the territorial boundaries of the state.64 The Court 
unanimously held that Florida could exercise jurisdiction over the 
defendant because the state retained a degree of sovereignty, shared 
with the federal government, that allowed it to assert jurisdiction over 
its citizens on the high seas.65 In the Court’s view, a state may “govern 
the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters 
in which the State has a legitimate interest and where there is no 
conflict with acts of Congress.”66 Some commentators have advocated 
that Skiriotes allows for citizenship jurisdiction rather than a strictly 
 
57. 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
58. See id. at 98. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 99. 
61. Id. at 99–100. 
62. 313 U.S. 69 (1941). 
63. Id. at 69–70. Florida actually claimed that the defendant was within its 
territorial waters, which was three leagues (nine nautical miles) from the 
shore, according to the state’s 1885 constitution. Id. at 70. This claim was 
more than what the federal government claimed in international treaties 
with Spain and in diplomatic correspondence discussing the territorial 
waters of the United States around Florida. Id. at 71. The defendant 
primarily argued that the state did not have jurisdiction because the state 
could not constitutionally assert jurisdiction beyond waters claimed by 
the federal government. Id. The Court assumed this was true. Id. at 74. 
64. Id. at 74–75. 
65. Id. at 77. 
66. Id.  
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territorial-based jurisdiction.67 There is also some early case precedent 
from state courts that suggest this is possible.68 Most state courts now, 
however, limit the holding in Skiriotes to state citizens on the high seas, 
not on land in other states.69 
B. Territorial-Scope Statutes 
Most states today have codified their criminal jurisdictional rules 
in the form of territorial-scope statutes.70 The earliest versions of these 
statutes addressed specific crimes rather than broadly granting 
authority to prosecute any crime with conduct occurring outside the 
state.71 In the case of homicide, these statutes generally provided for 
jurisdiction in the state where the victim died, not just where the injury 
occurred as allowed by the common law.72 Rather than trying to assert 
jurisdiction over crimes committed outside the state, instead these 
statutes “pull[ed] the crime into the state where the death occurred.”73 
State supreme courts, hearing challenges to these statutes, accepted 
their constitutionality, citing legislatures’ sovereign power to declare 
certain acts offenses against the state.74 This included courts that 
otherwise believed in upholding the strict territorial rule from the 
common law.75 
 
67. See 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, at § 16.4(c); infra text 
accompanying notes 116–117; Rollin M. Perkins, The Territorial Principle 
in Criminal Law, 22 Hastings L.J. 1155, 1163–64 (1971). 
68. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. 172, 181 (1819) (upholding 
statute creating jurisdiction over Virginia defendants who committed 
larceny in the District of Columbia); State ex rel Chandler v. Main, 16 Wis. 
398, 400–01 (1863) (upholding statute that criminalized voter fraud 
committed by Wisconsin soldiers fighting in the Civil War). 
69. See 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, at § 16.4(c) n.118 (collecting cases). 
70. Id. at § 16.4(c). 
71. See Berge, supra note 21, at 249, 251. 
72. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 171, § 19 (1862); The Code of West 
Virginia 896 (John A. Warth ed., 3d ed. 1891) (reporting W. Va. Code 
ch. 144, § 6). The English parliament also passed a statute allowing 
homicide trials to occur both in the place where the victim was struck and 
where the victim died. 3 Coke, supra note 27, at 48. 
73. Berge, supra note 21, at 251. 
74. See Hunter v. State, 40 N.J.L. 495, 510 (N.J. 1878) (holding that state legis–
lature had authority to pass territorial-scope statute under its unrestricted 
plenary powers granted by the state constitution); State v. Hall, 19 S.E. 
602, 603 (N.C. 1894) (“Statutes of this character ‘are founded upon the 
general power of the legislature . . . to declare any willful or negligent act 
which causes an injury to person or property within its territory to be a 
crime.’” (citation omitted)). 
75. See ex parte McNeely, 14 S.E. 436, 439–40 (W. Va. 1892) (upholding 
territorial-scope statute that conferred jurisdiction over homicide prose–
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The real transformation in territorial-scope statutes came after 
Strassheim. Emboldened by the language in Strassheim, state 
legislatures passed the first generation of territorial-scope statutes that 
expanded their state’s territorial jurisdiction to prosecute crimes 
generally.76 These early statutes generally provided jurisdiction in four 
contexts—for prosecutions of: (1) crimes that began outside the forum 
state but were consummated within the forum state; (2) crimes that 
began within the forum state but were consummated outside; (3) crimes 
committed in whole or in part within the forum state; and 
(4) accessories to crimes committed in the forum state physically 
located outside the forum state.77 
Courts, while generally upholding these statutes, were still hesitant 
to assert jurisdiction when the connection between the criminal conduct 
and the forum state was minimal. When interpreting provisions 
providing jurisdiction for acts within the forum state, courts often 
applied Justice Cardozo’s interpretation in People v. Werblow,78 that 
these provisions provide jurisdiction only when the in-state conduct was 
significant enough to “amount to an attempt” to commit that crime 
within the state.79 As an example, courts applying this attempt rule do 
not consider jurisdiction proper over a homicide prosecution when the 
plan was formulated in the state but the defendant’s plan was to travel 
outside of the state to commit the murder.80 Similarly, courts generally 
required that the defendant be aware that the consequence of his or her 
criminal conduct would occur in the state seeking prosecution.81 
 
cutions when victim died in the state despite believing common law did not 
allow for it). 
76. 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, § 16.4(c); Kramer, supra note 30, at 1436–
37. This is not to say that every state expanded their jurisdiction through 
statutes. Some states adopted the “detrimental effects” doctrine from 
Strassheim through judicial rulings rather than through statutes. See, e.g., 
State v. Butler, 724 A.2d 657, 663 n.5 (Md. 1999) (stating Maryland 
legislature has not expanded state’s jurisdiction through statute). 
77. See, e.g., Berge, supra note 21, at 254 n.40 (collecting statutes). 
78. 148 N.E. 786 (N.Y. 1925). 
79. Id. at 789; People v. Buffum, 256 P.2d 317, 320 (Cal. 1953); People v. Holt, 
440 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ill. 1982); State v. Harrington, 260 A.2d 692, 697 (Vt. 
1969); State v. Lane, 771 P.2d 1150, 1156–57 (Wash. 1989) (Utter, J., 
concurring). See also 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, § 16.4(c). 
80. See People v. Garton, 412 P.3d 315, 336 (Cal. 2018). California still uses a 
territorial-scope statute based on the first generation of such statutes. See 
Cal. Penal Code § 27 (West 2014); see also 4 LaFave et al., supra note 
19, § 16.4(c) n.90. 
81. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fafone, 621 N.E.2d 1178, 1179 (Mass. 1993) 
(holding jurisdiction not proper in Massachusetts over defendant who sold 
drugs in Florida to a distributor in Massachusetts because defendant did 
not know distributor was located in Massachusetts); Moreno v. Baskerville, 
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Most states now have territorial-scope statutes that are modelled 
after the Model Penal Code.82 Model Penal Code Section 1.03 provides 
jurisdiction over a broader range of conduct occurring within and 
without the state than the earlier territorial-scope statutes. Like many 
of the early statutes, however, these statutes still require actual proof 
that some criminal conduct occurred within the state.83 Furthermore, 
like the early statutes as well, the Model Penal Code provides for 
jurisdiction when either the defendant commits acts within the state in 
furtherance of a crime or intends to cause harm in the state.84 States, 
in other words, have been reluctant to adopt statutes that vitiate the 
territorial principle. Despite some endorsement from the Supreme Court 
to broaden jurisdiction, territorial-scope statutes still require some sort 
of nexus between the crime and the territory of the state. 
II. Due Process and Evidentiary Presumptions 
Considering that state governments have broad discretion to 
establish jurisdiction through the use of presumptions, it is important 
to consider what limits there are in creating an evidentiary presumption 
in a criminal case. The Due Process Clause “protects the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”85 
The basic principle of fairness inherent in the Due Process Clause 
prevents the prosecution from relying on evidentiary presumptions that 
remove its burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.86 
Mandatory presumptions—presumptions that require a jury to reach a 
certain conclusion if the prosecution proves certain predicate facts—are 
not allowed in criminal cases when the presumption transfers the 
prosecution’s burden of persuasion to the defendant.87 On the other 
 
452 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Va. 1995) (holding jurisdiction not proper in Virginia 
over defendant who sold drugs to distributor in Arizona who then 
distributed it in Virginia because defendant did not sell drugs knowing they 
would be distributed in Virginia). 
82. 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, § 16.4(c). 
83. See Model Penal Code § 1.03(1) (Am. L. Inst. 1985). For examples of 
territorial-scope statutes modelled on the Model Penal Code that have 
actually been implemented, see Haw. Rev. Stat. § 701-106 (2017); Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. § 13-108 (2021) (providing for jurisdiction over an offense if 
“conduct outside this state constitutes an attempt or conspiracy to commit 
an offense within this state and an act in furtherance of the attempt or 
conspiracy occurs within this state”) (emphasis added). 
84. See Model Penal Code § 1.03(1) (Am. L. Inst. 1985). 
85. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
86. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313 (1985). 
87. Id. at 314 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977)). 
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hand, permissive inferences, which allow the jury to decide whether to 
reach a certain conclusion or not, are allowed in criminal cases as long 
as the “suggested conclusion” is one “that reason and common sense 
justify in light of proven facts before the jury.”88 
The restriction against mandatory presumptions, however, is 
limited to when the presumption relieves the prosecution from having 
to prove an element of the offense.89 This therefore necessitates a 
discussion on whether territorial jurisdiction is an element of a criminal 
offense. The sole consensus among state courts is that the prosecution 
bears the burden to prove jurisdiction; there is no consensus on whether 
it is an element of the offense.90 Some state courts hold that jurisdiction 
is an element of the offense91 while others do not.92 Courts holding that 
jurisdiction is an element of the offense generally do so because the fact 
that the crime occurred against the laws of the forum state is necessary 
for there to be a crime in that state in the first place.93 
There is a considerable degree of consensus, however, that 
jurisdiction must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A large 
majority of state courts require that the prosecution prove jurisdiction 
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, at least when the fact of 
 
88. Id. at 314–15. 
89. Id. at 314. 
90. 4 LaFave, supra note 19, § 16.4(d). 
91. See, e.g., Alkhalidi v. State, 753 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ind. 2001); State v. 
Casilla, 829 A.2d 1095, 1099 (N.J. 2003); State v. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181, 
184 (Iowa 1994). The Model Penal Code defines jurisdiction as being an 
element of an offense. Model Penal Code § 1.13(9)(e) (Am. L. Inst. 
1985). Some states adopted this provision into their statutory law. See, e.g., 
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 701-114(1)(c) (2017); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 625:11(III)(e) (2016). Many, however, have not done so despite adopting 
other portions of the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., State v. Willoughby, 892 
P.2d 1319, 1327 (Ariz. 1995). 
92. See, e.g., Calton v. State, 176 S.W.3d 231, 234–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); 
Willoughby, 892 P.2d at 1327; State v. Butler, 724 A.2d 657, 663 n.5 (Md. 
1999). 
93. See Sundling v. State, 679 N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The court 
in Sundling explained:  
Territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily thought of as an element 
of a crime. Nevertheless, the territorial jurisdiction is a fact that 
must be established. Indiana Statutes do not define jurisdiction as 
an element of the offense; however, where the law has established 
the necessity of a certain fact for an existence of that fact is treated 
much like an element of the offense. In this case then territorial 
jurisdiction is an element of the offense that must be proved by the 
state. 
 Id. (quoting McKinney v. State, 553 N.E.2d 860, 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)). 
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jurisdiction is disputed.94 The states that treat jurisdiction as an 
element naturally require proof beyond a reasonable doubt because it 
is part of the government’s case.95 The states that do not consider 
jurisdiction as an element, on the other hand, require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt for policy reasons.96 States often justify this more 
stringent standard of proof because of the gravity of a court erroneously 
exercising its jurisdiction over a defendant.97 Ohio, for its part, requires 
the prosecution to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a 
conviction under Ohio law but has not addressed jurisdiction.98 
Even if it is not entirely clear whether jurisdiction is always an 
element of an offense, there are some considerations that suggest that 
courts should treat jurisdiction as an element at least when jurisdiction 
is in dispute. One such consideration is the fairness of the prosecution. 
It is self-evident that defendants challenging the overreach of a state 
statute will rely on due process when challenging it.99 Several courts, in 
fact, explicitly require a due process fairness analysis when determining 
the legality of a state’s territorial jurisdiction.100 The American Law 
Institute, when promulgating the Model Penal Code, recognized that 
some restrictions on a state’s ability to exercise jurisdiction is necessary 
to ensure “the state’s assertion of jurisdiction does not result in 
 
94. See Willoughby, 892 P.2d at 1325–26 (collecting cases). See also 4 LaFave 
et al., supra note 19, § 16.4(d). A few states only require proof of juris–
diction by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See People v. Cavanaugh, 282 P.2d 53, 59 (Cal. 1955); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-501(3) (2017). 
95. See Liggins, 524 N.W.2d at 184–85 (collecting cases). See also 4 LaFave 
et al., supra note 19, § 16.4(d). 
96. See 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, § 16.4(d). 
97. See, e.g., State v. Baldwin, 305 A.2d 555, 559 (Me. 1973); Lane v. State, 
388 So. 2d 1022, 1028–29 (Fla. 1980); see also 4 LaFave et al., supra note 
19, at § 16.4(d) n. 137. 
98. State v. Hampton, 983 N.E.2d 324, 328 (Ohio 2012); State v. Wogenstahl, 
84 N.E.3d 1008, 1017 (Ohio 2017) (French, J., concurring). 
99. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (challenging 
constitutionality of city ordinance barring handguns in the city through 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). See also Lea Brilmayer 
& Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due 
Process, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1219 (1992) (“[W]hen faced with state 
legislative overreaching, defendants tend to fall back on . . . the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
100. See State v. Rimmer, 877 N.W.2d 652, 665–66 (Iowa 2016) (quoting State 
v. Sumulikoski, 110 A.3d 856, 866 (N.J. 2015)); People v. Gayheart, 776 
N.W.2d 330, 344–45 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (citing United States v. Hague, 
449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981)). See also State v. Randle, 647 N.W.2d 324, 329 
n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002); United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171, 1177 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
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unfairness to the defendant.”101 The commentary to the Code also 
recognized certain advantages in having jurisdiction based on the 
location of the offense, including the availability of witnesses and the 
concept that the community should dictate the condemnation of the 
conduct.102 
This makes sense considering the purpose of the criminal law in the 
first place: the right of a government to prohibit behavior it considers 
against its interests.103 Jurisdiction is, after all, “the very power of the 
state to exert influence over a criminal defendant [that] cannot be 
waived.”104 It is therefore necessary to know which state’s laws were 
violated to vindicate the purposes of those laws. This would be 
especially important when one state criminalizes certain conduct that 
is not criminal elsewhere. This would explain why prosecutors, as agents 
of a government, always have the burden to prove that they have the 
authority to prosecute the defendant by offering proof of jurisdiction.105 
Even if in most circumstances this burden is easily met, it would be 
unreasonable to then discard that burden when there is an actual 
dispute.   
III. Territorial-Scope Statutes with Evidentiary 
Presumption Provisions 
Considering that territorial-scope statutes cannot include manda–
tory presumptions, this section will address whether Subsection (D) is 
permissible by comparing it to another common presumption: the 
location-of-the-body presumption. Many states contain a statutory 
provision that allows for a presumption of jurisdiction in a homicide 
prosecution if the body of the victim was discovered in the forum 
state.106 The mechanics of this presumption are simple: if the prose–
 
101. Model Penal Code § 1.03 explanatory note, at 35 (Am. L. Inst. 1985). 
102. Id. at § 1.03 cmt. 1, at 38. 
103. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985). 
104. Lane v. State, 388 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. 1980).  
105. See 4 LaFave et al., supra note 19, at § 16.4(d) n. 120–21. 
106. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.11(B) (“If any part of the body of a 
homicide victim is found in this state, the death is presumed to have 
occurred in this state.”); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-108(B) (2021); Fla. 
Stat. § 910.005(2) (2020); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-2-1(c) (2020); Haw. Rev. 
Stat. § 701-106(4) (2017); 38 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1–5(b) (2012); Ind. 
Code § 35-41-1-1(c) (2018); Iowa Code Ann. § 803.1(2) (2021); Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 500.060(3) (West 2021); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, 
§ 7(3) (2021); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 541.191(2) (2021); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 46-2-101(2) (2021); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625:4(III) (2020); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-3(d) (West 2021); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 
§ 20.20(2)(a) (McKinney 2021); Or. Rev. Stat. § 131.235(2) (2019); 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 102(c) (2019); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.04(b) 
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cution proves beyond a reasonable doubt the fact that the body of the 
victim was discovered in the forum state, the law allows for the 
presumption that the death occurred in that state.107 Because death is 
an element of the homicide offense, presuming that the death occurred 
in the state establishes jurisdiction under statutory provisions allowing 
jurisdiction for homicide prosecutions in the state where the death 
occurred. The rationale behind this presumption is rather simple: “to 
prevent abortion of the prosecution in cases where the body of the 
victim is found within the state but it is unclear where the death, injury, 
or conduct occurred.”108 By 1985, when the Model Penal Code was 
promulgated, twenty-eight states had adopted some form of provision 
that created this specific presumption.109 Courts considering the 
permissibility of these provisions generally uphold them as long as the 
jury is allowed to assume jurisdiction, and not required to do so.110 
Far less common are provisions like Subsection (D).111 Subsection 
(D) allows for a presumption of jurisdiction when there is evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime occurred either in Ohio or 
another jurisdiction but the actual jurisdiction cannot “reasonably be 
determined.”112 The mechanics of this presumption in practice are 
somewhat muddled. While some Ohio courts seem to require some 
evidence that unknown conduct occurred as part of a pattern of 
criminal conduct that could be established in Ohio,113 others invoke 
Subsection (D) as establishing jurisdiction in Ohio by the simple act of 
an Ohio grand jury indicting the defendant under the laws of Ohio.114 
 
(West 2021); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(3)(a) (West 2021). See also 
Model Penal Code § 1.03(4) (Am. L. Inst. 1985). 
107. For specific examples of this presumption in action see, for example, 
McKinney v. State, 553 N.E.2d 860, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); People v. 
Rodriguez, 159 A.D.3d 646, 647 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018). 
108. Model Penal Code § 1.03 cmt. 8, at 63 (Am. L. Inst. 1985). 
109. Id. at 65. 
110. See, e.g., McKinney, 553 N.E.2d at 863; State v. Butler, 724 A.2d 657, 
663 n.4 (Md. 1999). See also Model Penal Code § 1.03 cmt. 8, at 64 
(Am. L. Inst. 1985) (“[The presumption] does not dispense with a jury 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the ultimate jurisdictional fact but 
it permits such a finding upon proof of the location of the body.”). 
111. Only one other state, Maine, contains a similarly worded provision. See 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 7(4) (2021). 
112. Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.11(D) (2005). 
113. See Leyman v. Bradshaw, 59 N.E.3d 1236, 1239 (Ohio 2016); State v. 
Hall, No. 90365, 2009 WL 270524, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2009). 
114. See State v. Williams, 557 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); State v. 
Hamilton, No. 13CA93, 2014 WL 3556460, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 17, 
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Despite the ambiguity on how the presumption operates, it is 
obvious from the plain language of Subsection (D), however, that it 
creates a conclusory presumption.115 On that basis, Subsection (D) is 
unconstitutional. 
IV. Proposed Solutions 
Because it creates a mandatory presumption that vitiates the 
prosecution’s burden to prove a necessary fact, Subsection (D) is 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. In the interests of 
justice, it is important to now consider solutions this problem. 
A. Prosecution in Indiana 
The simplest solution would be to prosecute Wogenstahl in Indiana. 
Indiana’s territorial-scope statute includes a provision creating a 
presumption of jurisdiction when a body is discovered in the state.116 
This presumption is a permissive inference in Indiana,117 therefore 
surviving constitutional muster. It would not be difficult for an Indiana 
prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Amber Garrett’s 
body was found in Indiana because there is no dispute that her body 
was discovered in Bright, Indiana.118 Conducting a second prosecution 
in Indiana naturally creates problems. Despite the obvious logistical 
problems of conducting a second prosecution, the issue of double 
jeopardy comes to mind. However, because his aggravated murder 
conviction in Ohio would be void for lack of jurisdiction and not a lack 
of evidence, double jeopardy would not bar his prosecution.119 
B. Permissive Inference 
Another possible solution would be to rewrite Subsection (D) to 
create a permissive inference rather than a conclusive presumption. 
Instead of requiring the trier of fact to presume jurisdiction, a rewritten 
Subsection (D) would allow the trier of fact to decide whether it wants 
to infer jurisdiction in Ohio or not. There is, however, still a defect in 
 
2014); State v. Smith, No. 14 CA 15, 2014 WL 4536269, at *2 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Sep. 12, 2014). 
115. Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.11(D) (2005); State v. Wogenstahl, 84 N.E.3d 
1008, 1018 (Ohio 2017) (French, J., concurring). 
116. Ind. Code § 35-41-1-1(c) (2018). 
117. McKinney v. State, 553 N.E.2d 860, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 
118. See Wogenstahl, 94 N.E.3d at 1012. 
119. See Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 402 (1987) (“It is a ‘venerable principl[e] 
of double jeopardy jurisprudence’ that ‘[t]he successful appeal of a judgment 
of conviction, on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to 
support the verdict poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge.” 
(quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90–91 (1978) (internal 
citations omitted))).  
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this presumption even as a permissive inference—the lack of any proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This presumption is only invoked when the 
trier of fact cannot reasonably determine where the proper jurisdiction 
is located. In other words, even if the jury had the option to choose 
whether to presume jurisdiction in Ohio, it invoked that presumption 
because the prosecution failed to meet a burden to prove a fact beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
Conclusion 
Although states have broad authority to define its jurisdiction, that 
authority is not unfettered. Fairness dictates the scope in which the 
government may assert its jurisdiction. Creating a presumption that 
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